There is more than one idea at play here. Thus commercial common sense is a factor which is variously described as requiring the court to produce a "commercial solution" 7 or "commercial result" 8 or a "commercially sensible result", to promote the parties' "commercial aims and objectives", 9 to display "commerciality", 10 to take account of "the commercialities", 11 to have regard to "commercial and factual background known to both parties", 12 to consider the perspective of a "reasonable commercial reader", 13 to prefer an interpretation which has a "greater degree of common sense" 14 than another, and to avoid a result which is "unworkable" 15 or (as we shall see extensively in Section IV) "obviously absurd". 16 On closer inspection, this notion of "commerciality" covers at least six different points: (1) commercial documents are to be read from the perspective of commercial users; in particular, the commercial reader abhors pedantry, including excessive technicality or semantic logic; (2) the court should avoid frustrating the parties' commercial object or purpose revealed by the contractual text and its factual matrix; (3) the adjudicator must understand the trade practices and market assumptions within the relevant contractual pigeon-hole; (4) inapt words can be overridden when manifestly inconsistent with business common sense (this overlaps with both "corrective construction", see nn. 41-47, and Rectification, nn. 38-40); (5) absurd constructions are to be avoided; (6) commercial common sense can be used as a compass to point the way when the court is confronted by rival meanings (points (1) to (6) are developed in Section III below).
In Section II, we begin by noting the central features of the English rules governing interpretation of written contracts. 17 Beatson L.J. in the Globe Motors case (2016) 18 conducted a thorough review of the modern English authorities and Christopher Clarke L.J.'s earlier encapsulation in Wood v Sureterm Direct Ltd & Capita Insurance Services Ltd (2015) has been described as "lucid" and "concise". 19 The position in Australia, 20 Canada, 21 Hong Kong, 22 New Zealand, 23 Singapore 24 and the USA 25 would require extensive further discussion. Section III contains analysis of judicial statements concerning commercial common sense (CCS). Those statements reveal three main points, which will be developed in Sections IV to VI: (1) CCS not only precludes "absurdity" (Section IV) but (2) it enables the court to select the superior interpretation, when there are rival meanings available (Section V); however, (3) there are four dangers, or causes for concern, which have emerged within the cases (Section VI). First, "commercial common sense" can be used as camouflage for partisan arguments which are really pleas for advantage not truly supported by the document. This card is too often played, sometimes by both sides. Judges should not be beguiled by forensic rhetoric. Secondly, judges should know when they are venturing perilously beyond their mercantile comfort-zone: they should not pretend to greater experience than they in fact possess. Thirdly, commercial common sense should not become a pretext for rewriting the text in order to "improve" it. Fourthly, a transaction's curious or tough wording 26 27 In the face of that possibility, judicial humility and restraint must be shown.
II. Interpretation: the Modern English System
In his latest 28 "restatement" of this topic, Lord Neuberger in Arnold v Britton (2015) 29 placed CCS fifth in his list of factors which supplement the major criterion of "objectivity":
"When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify…`what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean'…And it does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words...in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the [document], (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the [document], (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions."
The Common Law system of interpretation starts and ends 30 with "objectivity", 31 As for (2) (the bar on evidence of the parties' actual negotiations), the equitable doctrine of Rectification allows a party to place in evidence drafts or other negotiations in order to cure a mismatch between the parties' pre-formation settled intention and the wording adopted in the text of their final agreement 38 (objectivity also applies to determine whether there was a prior common intention). 39 Rectification can also be invoked to reflect one party's mistaken assumption concerning the contents of the proposed contract if the other party in bad faith had failed to point out that mistake before formation. 40 But, even without resort to Rectification, the ICS (1998) 41 and Chartbrook (2009) 42 cases confirm that the process of construction requires the courts to reconstruct phrases if it is obvious that something has gone wrong in the contractual formulation and it is also clear how the textual defect is to be put right (so-called "corrective construction"). However, a clear case must be established because Lord Hoffmann in the ICS case noted the presumption against linguistic mistakes. 43 This "something has gone wrong" (patent defect/obvious fix) rule 44 has been applied many times. 45 But it is controversial, 46 not least because it substantially duplicates the traditional function of Rectification. 47 Although the main focus of this discussion is written contracts, it should be noted 48 (1977) . 54 As we shall see in this Section, the root idea of a business-like approach to interpretation has produced six types of emphasis:
(1) anti-pedantry; (2) regard for a transaction's commercial purpose; (3) consideration of trade practices and market assumptions within the relevant contractual pigeon-hole; (4) overcoming drafting slips; (5) avoiding absurdity; (6) and, most significantly, commercial common sense can be used as a compass to guide the court when it encounters rival meanings.
Anti-pedantry and anti-literalism: contracts are written to be read by businessmen and not monopolised by lawyers
Commercial common sense requires the judge to consider how the document would be read by businessmen positioned in the relevant market or commercial context. In "The Starsin" (2003) Lord Bingham noted: 55 "business sense is that which businessmen, in the course of their ordinary dealings, would give the document." Judges have protested at over-refined and nit-picking semantic analysis, because this distracts from the task of viewing the relevant phrase within the whole document and against its commercial background. 56 There is also the potential embarrassment that a lower court's confident reliance on grammatical rules, such as the nature of a particular use of the past tense and whether it lacks any "continuous" connotation, might be convincingly falsified on appeal. 57 63 "…To seek to construe any instrument in ignorance or disregard of the circumstances which gave rise to it or the situation in which it is expected to take effect is in my view pedantic, sterile and productive of error. …To my mind construction is a composite exercise, neither uncompromisingly literal nor unswervingly purposive: the instrument must speak for itself, but it must do so in situ and not be transported to the laboratory for microscopic analysis."
Furthermore, some texts are simply unfit to be placed under the semantic microscope. As Lord Bingham said in "The Starsin" (2003): 64 "to seek perfect consistency and economy of draftsmanship in a complex form of contract which has evolved over many years is to pursue a chimera… If an obviously inappropriate form is used, its language must be adapted to apply to the particular case."
This emphasis upon adopting a business-like approach to reading commercial agreements is no novelty. In McCowan v Baine (1893), 65 the House of Lords held, construing an insurance contract, that a maritime collision between one vessel and "The Niobe" extended to the present case where a vessel collided with a tug pulling "The Niobe" (Lord Bramwell dissented). 66 In the majority, the Earl of Selborne referred 67 to the need to avoid "extreme literalism". 68 Lord Morris construed the contract as "as an insurance against...liability for payment by collision to be incurred by `The Niobe' while in tow…. I consider the tug part of the apparatus for moving the ship…, and that a collision by the tug while so towing…was a collision of `The Niobe' within the meaning of the...policy." Similarly, in the Southland Frozen Meat case (1898), Lord Herschell said that written provisions "must be construed in a business fashion, and that the words must not be applied to everything that might be said to come within a possible dictionary use of them, but must be interpreted in the way in which business men would interpret them, when used in relation to a business matter of this description." 69
The transaction's commercial purpose or object
The document's commercial "purpose" or "object" can be used, according to Lord Herschell L.C. 70 in Glynn v Margetson & Co (1893), "in limiting the general words used" and, according to Lord Halsbury, 71 to "reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract." In this case the House of Lords held that the written terms of a contract for carriage of oranges from Malaga to Liverpool did not entitle the shipowner to make deviations to remoter ports in the Mediterranean, because the consequent delay would obviously imperil a perishable cargo. This was so even though words had been introduced into the contract which appeared to grant the shipowner free rein to adopt an erratic route. Lord Herschell L.C. said that the contract needed to be construed "in a business sense", 72 and Lord Halsbury said: "[a person construing the contract] must consider whether mercantile men when they do business in this form do not recollect that a business sense will be given to business documents." 73 This was echoed by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds (1971): 74 "the commercial, or business object, of the transaction, objectively ascertained, may be a surrounding fact… And if it can be shown that one interpretation completely frustrates that object, to the extent of rendering the contract futile, that may be a strong argument for an alternative interpretation, if that can reasonably be found."
The document's "purpose", "object", "aim", 75 or "intended commercial result", 76 must be divined by reference to the contested portion of the agreement, the whole text, and relevant background facts and context. 77 The "purpose" or "object" should not be the judge's personal fantasy of how that type of transaction might ideally be reconstructed. As Lord Grabiner notes: 78 "It is critically important that the `commercial purpose' of the transaction is derived from the contract as a whole and from an accurate understanding of the way in which the various provisions interact." And Lewison (2015) 79 comments that courts must not adopt "a preconceived idea of what contracts of that description generally seek to achieve"
and then "force the words of the particular contract to fit that preconception". As Lord Wilberforce explained in the Reardon case (1976): 80 "the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating… [When] one is speaking of aim, or object, or commercial purpose, one is speaking objectively of what reasonable persons would have in mind in the situation of the parties…"
Trade practices and market assumptions within the relevant contractual pigeon-hole
The adjudicator must be made aware of relevant commercial usages, which might vary from locality to locality. For example, in Jacobs v Scott & Co (1899) 81 the House of Lords held that hay imported from Canada to Glasgow had to contain no more than 20 per cent clover and that the supplier, although not based in Scotland, was subject to that implicit specification. A higher percentage was tolerated in the other main UK hay markets, namely London and Bristol. The decision illustrates the variability of market standards within different parts of the UK.
Other usages might be "market-wide". And so in Tidal Energy Ltd v Bank of Scotland plc (2014) the Court of Appeal held that, when construing the contractual words "to the beneficiary", it was legitimate to impute to a bank customer the fact that bank transfers by the CHAPS system (clearing house automated payment system) do not require the transferor's bank to check the name of the intended transferee. 82 Lord Dyson M.R., with whom Tomlinson L.J. agreed, said: 83 "…a customer who uses CHAPS is taken to contract on the basis of the banking practice that governs CHAPS transactions. On the evidence which the judge accepted, there is a clear and settled practice that the receiving bank in a CHAPS transaction does not check the beneficiary's name for correspondence with the other identifiers." Lord Dyson M.R. went on 84 to consider numerous points of "business common sense" which supported his conclusion that a bank is not under an obligation to check the accuracy of the transferor's naming of the intended recipient of the funds. These comments are a convincing demonstration of the importance and analytical power of opening up issues of interpretation to full examination of the "commercial matrix", 85 that is, the exigencies and realities within which the relevant transaction is placed.
Another example of the court bringing to bear its informed knowledge of the nature of a transaction in a particular market is PST Energy Res Cogitans") (2016). 86 Here the Supreme Court held that a contract for the supply of bunkers (ship fuel) required the recipient to pay for fuel in fact used for ship propulsion even though, for technical reasons, the transaction fell outside the sale of goods legislation. 87 In the following passage, Lord Mance in the Supreme Court began by noting the wording: 88 "After going on to provide that the buyer `shall not be entitled to use the bunkers', the terms introduce the qualification `other than for the propulsion of the vessel'." He then explained the commercial context: 89 "The qualification clearly reflects a reality. Bunker suppliers know that bunkers are for use. If they grant relatively long credit periods combined with a reservation of title pending payment in full, it is unsurprising that they do so combined with an express qualification authorising use in propulsion, since standard terms prohibiting any use would be uncommercial or in practice, no doubt, simply ignored….[Those terms] -together with an admissible modicum of commercial awareness on the court's part about how ships operate (and in particular how owners strive to keep them operating) and about the value of credit and the likelihood that full advantage of it will be taken-all point in one direction. They demonstrate that the liberty to use the bunkers for propulsion prior to payment is a vital and essential feature of the bunker supply business."
As for the contention that the transaction was labelled for the "sale" of goods, and could not, therefore, be given effect outside the scheme of the Sale of Goods legislation, in the Court of Appeal Moore-Bick L.J. persuasively dismissed this argument as follows: 90 "The question is simply whether [in the language of the transaction] the characterisation by the parties of the contract as one of sale adequately reflects the substance of the obligations to which it gives rise. …[It] is no part of the court's function to shoehorn their contract into a category to which it does not properly belong in order to impose on them consequences which they did not intend."
The Court of Appeal then analysed the transaction as essentially hybrid. Although not a sale stricto sensu, it did give rise to a duty to pay for bunkers actually consumed, as well as those left unconsumed. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, as mentioned in the text above.
Of course, sometimes the court's judgment will itself directly 91 prescribe or adjust the relevant market practice or assumption, for example when the court authoritatively If this is an independent manifestation of "commercial common sense", it overlaps with both "corrective construction", see nn. 41-47, and Rectification, nn. 38-40.
Commercial common sense as a check against absurdity
In Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB ("The Antaios") (1985) Lord Diplock said: 96 "If detailed and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense it must yield to business common sense." See Section IV for expansion of this sub-topic.
Commercial common sense can be used as a compass to point the way when considering rival meanings
Lord Clarke in the "Rainy Sky" case (2011) made clear that a court need not wait until confronted by an extremely unreasonable or absurd construction before adopting a commercial perspective: 97 "It is not in my judgment necessary to conclude that, unless the most natural meaning of the words produces a result so extreme as to suggest that it was unintended, the court must give effect to that meaning." He added: 98 "If there are two possible constructions, the court is entitled to prefer the construction which is consistent with business common sense and to reject the other." Lord more than one interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most consistent with business common sense."
IV. Absurdity
A long-standing 100 application of commercial common sense is to avoid a construction which would "flout business common sense"; 101 or would be "commercially irrational"; 102 or something "no businessman in his senses" would accept; 103 or a "plainly ridiculous" result. 104 An influential statement is by Lord Diplock in "The Antaios" (1984): 105 "…if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must be made to yield to business commonsense. or commerce): "The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it, and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they shall make that intention abundantly clear." However, Lord Mustill in Charter Reinsurance Co. Ltd v Fagan (1997) 110 was underwhelmed by this "criterion", relegating it to a mere "rule of thumb".
As one passes along the spectrum from absurdity, and beyond "very unreasonable" results, one eventually arrives at much less demanding criteria: an "unusual" or "commercially surprising" construction. That degree of disquiet will not move the court. As Andrew Smith J. noted in the BP Oil case (2012), both parties' contentions had fallen short of establishing interpretations which would flout commercial common sense, and they amounted merely to arguments that the opponent's interpretation would "produce a result that businessmen would consider unusual and would be commercially surprising". 111 Another problem is that language which might seem absurd to one judge might not cause even a flicker of concern to another. 112 Although the case law continues to acknowledge the need to avoid an interpretation which would produce "absurdity", Briggs L. 
V. A Guide at Every Contractual Fork-in-the-Road
As we have seen in Section IV, commercial common sense is sometimes invoked as a criterion to avoid absurdity. But (as noted in Section III at (5)), CCS has a wider operation. 115 A fundamental statement is by Lord Clarke in the "Rainy Sky" case (2011): 116 "where a term of a contract is open to more than one interpretation, it is generally appropriate to adopt the interpretation which is most consistent with business common sense." This means that where it is clear that one (tenable) meaning is powerfully, or at least clearly, supported by commercial considerations, and a rival (also tenable) argument is not, the court should adopt the first meaning 117 (unless 118 perhaps there is another countervailing factor, such as the internal structure of the relevant contract, which fortifies the latter construction).
The intellectual stimulus for this broader function of CCS is Lord Wilberforce's discussion of commercial background and purpose in both Prenn v Simmonds (1971) 119 and the Reardon case (1976). 120 Those speeches triggered a judicial chain-reaction. 121 Thus, ten years after the Reardon case, but a quarter of a century before the "Rainy Sky" (2011), Hoffmann J. in 1986 had captured the spirit of the new approach: 122 "if the language is capable of more than one meaning, I think the court is entitled to select the meaning which accords with the apparent commercial purpose of the clause rather than one which appears commercially irrational."
Commercial common sense forms part of the overall objective inquiry
However, as Lord Neuberger's "restatement" in Arnold v Britton (2015) 123 (quoted in Section II above) makes clear, commercial common sense is not an independent criterion operating in tandem with the foremost criterion of objectivity (the two lens theory). Instead commercial common sense is merely part of the objective inquiry to discover the legally operative meaning of the document (the one lens theory document, must be commercially informed: 124 "… The words must be interpreted by reference to what a reasonable person (who is informed with business common sense, the knowledge of the parties, including of course the other provisions of the contract, and the experience and expertise enjoyed by the parties, at the time of the contract) would have understood by the provision." In practice, this will be the product of both the court's pool of commercial experience (as it were, "commercial judicial notice") 125 and specific information acquired during the course of the case, notably when dealing with a "niche" transaction.
And so there is only one endeavour or exercise, which is the "unitary" 126 task of constructing the objective meaning, using the following four main tools or instruments: (1) the words immediately in issue must be read against the whole text (or set of documents), 127 it being "very dangerous to construe an expression in isolation" 128 and the focus on the immediately disputed portion can cause the reader to fail to see the wood for the trees 129 (earlier concluded documents, but not the parties' negotiations, can become accessible under the factual matrix principle); 130 (2) the document's purpose(s); (3) surrounding facts and assumptions, to which the parties are deemed to have been privy at the time of formation; and (4) commercial common sense can be used to avoid absurdity (Section IV above) and it can operate, still more frequently, as a compass to point the way when considering rival meanings (see Section III (6)). However, for all these purposes and at all stages, the adjudicator is denied access to, and must exclude consideration of, declarations of subjective intent and evidence of negotiations or post-formation conduct (for those evidential exclusions, see the text at nn. 34-37 above). [20] . ' The judge (Nerys Jefford Q.C.) adopted, as a matter of ordinary construction, the subcontractor's suggested interpretation. Having listed the salient points made by Lord Neuberger in Arnold v Britton, 133 the judge in the Carillion case formulated this summary: 134 "the court should first look for the natural meaning of the words used in the contract and not be too ready to depart from the natural meaning on the basis of the meaning the court thinks accords with commercial common sense. However, the more unclear the words or the worse the drafting, the more ready the court should be to do so. When considering the parties' intended commercial meaning of the words used, the court should be careful to have regard only to what the parties knew or could reasonably have known at the time of entering into the contract."
Commercial common sense not to be overplayed
The judge, Nerys Jefford Q.C., then explained that, in her view (which has been upheld by the Court of Appeal), the present clause was unproblematic 135 and "clear" (noting that a court should then be slow to deviate from that view reached by textual examination and regard to the factual matrix). 136 But in any event, the judge added, the interpretation adopted was not commercially objectionable: 137 "I do not, however, consider that this meaning does not accord with commercial common sense. [The sub-contractor's] interpretation…is practicable and workable and is what a reasonable person with all the background knowledge of the parties would have thought the clause meant at the time the contract was entered into."
The text is the primary source of guidance. It might emerge from the forensic debate that there is more than one possible construction. But the document cannot be tortured, in the name of commercial common sense, into yielding a "rival" meaning which has no support at all in the text. A choice can be made, but only if there are genuine rivals. Commercial common sense is not a magician capable of pulling rabbits out of thin air. To quote again from the "Rainy Sky" case (2011), Lord Clarke made clear that CCS enables the judge to umpire as between "two [or more] possible constructions", 138 that is, "where a term of a contract is open to more than one interpretation". 139 Even then, CCS does not command the whole field. Instead it remains important to keep in view the entire document. As Lord Clarke explained, the court is engaged in "an iterative process, involving checking each of the rival meanings against other provisions of the document and investigating its commercial consequences" (emphasis added). 140 Even before Arnold v Britton (see discussion in the previous paragraphs), the post-Rainy Sky case law had made clear that a putative "rival" meaning must be tenable, having regard to the text and its factual matrix. In Procter & Gamble Company v Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA (2012), Moore-Bick L.J. said that if the language is "reasonably capable of being given two possible meanings" then, but only then, "the court should prefer that [meaning] which better accords with the overall objective of the contract or with good commercial sense". 141 Similarly, other cases have referred to "genuinely alternative meanings of an ambiguous provision", 142 or "language capable of bearing" different meanings, 143 or a "material ambiguity" 144 (Akenhead J. noting in the RWE Npower case (2013): "Often, on analysis, apparent ambiguities are not ambiguities at all"). 145 The court is required to conduct a "holistic" or "global" examination of the whole contract in order to determine whether real ambiguity exists or whether the suggested doubt is in fact a mirage 146 (although, it is suggested, the better 147 usage is not "ambiguity" but "alternative reading" 148 or lack of clarity). Lewison L.J. expressed the issue clearly in the Napier Park case (2014): "Once an alternative reading emerges as a possible meaning, the interpreter must go on to consider which of two or more possible meanings is the more commercially sensible." 149 As Lord Hodge put it crisply in Arnold v Britton (2015): 150 "there must be a basis in the words used and the factual matrix for identifying a rival meaning".
Clear language causing countervailing commercial common sense points to melt away
No lack of clarity was discerned in Edgeworth Capital (Luxembourg) SARL v Ramblas Investments BV (2015). And so Hamblen J. concluded that arguments based on "commerciality" had failed to reach the target. 151 Similarly, Henderson J. in the Flanagan case (2015) held that a notice period specified in a limited liability partnership agreement contained no ambiguity and so it was unnecessary for him on that occasion to consider arguments founded on commercial common sense. 152 In Cottonex Anstalt v Patriot Spinning Mills Ltd (2014) Hamblen J. suggested that there is no mechanical rule of construction that the court will accede to an interpretation just because one party has sought to bolster it by an appeal to business sense. 153 Everything must depend on the lack of clarity of the text: 154 "The more ambiguous the meaning and the stronger the business common sense arguments the more likely it is to be appropriate to do so." These comments indicate that an argument founded on commercial common sense will not induce the court to adopt a disputed construction in one party's favour if that argument has only "marginal" weight and there is little ambiguity. 155 A fortiori, Hamblen J. is making clear that commercial common sense should not tip the balance when the court is satisfied that the text, construed in context, provides a clear answer. 156 Similarly, Leggatt J. said in Tartsinis v Navona Management Co (2015): 157 "There is…a need for caution in relying on arguments of `commercial common sense', particularly when they conflict with the intention naturally to be inferred from the language which the parties have chosen to express their bargain."
VI. "There May be Trouble Ahead" 158
It is clear that commercial common sense must not get too big for its boots. The main problems arising under the post-"Rainy Sky" (2011) regime 159 will now be presented under these headings: (1) confusion: the battle of party assertion; (2) competence: judges should know the limits of their commercial experience; (3) textual fidelity: parties make contracts and not judges; (4) courts are not to be swayed by "sympathy" for one side.
Confusion: the battle of party assertion
Judges are wary of parties who present exaggerated or flimsy appeals to CCS. Often each party seeks to "trumpet" 160 commercial common sense with more or less equal plausibility, so that they are in truth engaged in making rival assertions of commercial attractiveness or reasonableness, and presenting arguments which "fly in different directions" or are "not clear-cut". 161 One party's commercial common sense is an opponent's commercial nonsense.
Dead-lock 162 can be produced by the collision of "reasonable arguments both ways". 163 Intellectually honest judges must then admit that they cannot "conclude with confidence that there is an interpretation which makes more business common sense" and that, in such a situation, it is "often difficult for a court of law to make nice judgments as to where business common sense lies." 164 As Lord Mustill warned: "where there is no obvious difficulty, and simply assertions by either side that its own interpretation yields the more sensible result, there is room for error". 165 A controversial resort to notions of "commercial common sense" is the Court of Appeal's difficult decision in Rice v Great Yarmouth Borough Council (2000) . 166 This was a four-year contract for the maintenance by the claimant of the defendant's sports and parks facilities. The written contract gave the defendant the right to terminate for "breach of any of [Rice's] obligations under the Contract". But it was held that "any" (a short word which means "any") should not be taken to mean "any at all", otherwise the parties would have created a "draconian" contractual regime, 167 and that would "fly in the face of commercial sense". Instead "any" was construed as code for "any repudiatory" breach. 168 The Court of Appeal, therefore, concluded that termination would be justified only if there had been "repudiation" by a pattern of breaches. 169 But the breaches had not been cumulatively serious enough on these facts. The case has excited much critical comment. 170
Competence: judges should know the limits of their commercial experience
Civil judges must not assume that they are masters of all trades, including "fishmongers and carriers of fish", 171 175 comments, "neither the advocates who argue points of construction nor the judges who determine them are commercial men" and so they should refrain from latching on to "a preconceived idea of what contracts of that description generally seek to achieve" and then trying to "force the words of the particular contract to fit that preconception". 198 "they often have different provisions drafted inserted or added to by different lawyers at different times; they often include last-minute amendments agreed in a hurry, frequently in the small hours of the morning after intensive negotiations, with a view to achieving finality rather than clarity; indeed, often the skill of the drafting lawyer is in producing obscurity, rather than clarity, so that two inconsistent interests can feel satisfied with the result."
In the absence of a concurrent Rectification claim (see text at nn. 38-40 above), these matters are concealed behind the curtain of the pre-contractual negotiation evidence bar (see text at nn. 35-36 above): "the reasonable addressee of the instrument has not been privy to the negotiations and cannot tell whether a provision favourable to one side was not in exchange for some concession elsewhere or simply a bad bargain." 199 The court will not engage in "guessing" 200 what the negotiations might have been: that would be "pure speculation" 201 because it is "impossible, and in any event impermissible, to try to recreate the thinking of either party in the negotiations". 202 For this reason, Ltd (2015) 203 reversed the first instance judge, who had given a wide scope to an indemnity clause in a share purchase agreement. The Court of Appeal said that the judge's decision to fill a so-called "gap" in the scope of an indemnity was unsafe. The very question whether there was a gap was contestable. Even if truly there had been a gap, this might not have been the result of an over-sight in the drafting, but instead the conscious outcome of hard-fought negotiation. However, the court cannot probe these uncertainties. As Christopher Clarke L.J. said: 204 "the court will not be aware of the negotiations between the parties. What may appear, at least from one side's point of view, as lacking in business common sense, may be the product of a compromise which was the only means of reaching agreement."
On the other hand, the court might conclude that the contract is simply "incoherent" 205 or "badly constructed". 206 As Lord Neuberger admitted in Arnold v Britton (2015): "when it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, I accept that the less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning." 207 If, despite earnest attempts to find linguistic clues, the relevant text does not provide a reliable answer, the court can appropriately abandon "semantic niceties" and instead concentrate on trying to achieve a business-like construction. 208 This is not uncommon, as Arden L.J. explained in the Golden Key case (2009): 209 "The court can spend a great deal of time immersed in the detail of lengthy contractual documents searching for clues. That task has to be carried out but if, despite a thorough search, the position is still unclear, and more than one meaning is properly available, the right approach is surely to give greater weight to the presumption that the parties must have intended some commercial result than to the textual clues if the latter yields an uncommercial result."
However, judges should not despair too quickly. The courts must not be linguistically overfastidious. Judges might trip themselves up by latching onto the fact that the document contains "flaws" 210 or textual "infelicity" or that it is badly structured. Nearly every great work of literature is flawed and business is often conducted in a hurry. Commercial documents will not have been proof-read by Ezra Pound. The court will take into account the fact that the contract has been composed by lay persons without legal assistance, 211 or at least that it was "not finalised by lawyers". 212 Even when considering professionally drafted documents, courts should not become fixated by tautology 213 or erratic punctuation. 214 It is also a fallacy to suppose that the contract must be read as an expression of equal entitlement. As Beatson L.J.'s cogent analysis of a long-term exclusivity supply agreement in the Globe Motors case (2016) 224 demonstrates, judges must be attuned to the internal structure of the transaction and the balance of forces which that structure reveals. In that case the Court of Appeal overruled 225 the judge who had unacceptably "read in" words and reached a conclusion which was at odds with the true balance of interests reflected in the document. Although the trial judge had said that it is not the province of the court to re-make the contract by devising "a reasonable and appropriate contract term to suit the judge's view of the circumstances" 226 and instead the judicial task is to show fidelity to the text, the judge was shown by the Court of Appeal to have fallen into this very trap. His decision was reversed because he had injected, under the guise of interpretation, an obligation which was not supported by the text. 227 In Arnold v Britton (2015) the Supreme Court emphasised that commercial common sense is not an ex post facto release mechanism capable of responding "retrospectively" 228 to one party's "regrets" that the contract has worked out badly. 229 It would be wrong to rewrite a clear clause in the interest of abstract fairness: 230 "[construction is not intended] to rewrite the parties' agreement because it was unwise to gamble on future economic circumstances in a long term contract or because subsequent events have shown that the natural meaning of the words has produced a bad bargain for one side." The Supreme Court instead suggested that the cure on those facts, which concerned "wretchedly conceived clauses", 231 might be either mediation 232 or legislation, 233 but not verbal manipulation or textual reconstruction by a court.
In MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cottonex Anstalt (2016) Moore-Bick L.J. roundly declared that there is no general principle of good faith "in matters of contract". 234 This is not the occasion to enter into the merits of that traditional position. 235 At first instance in that case, Leggatt J. had held that it was against good faith for an owner of sea cargo containers to sue the hiring party for demurrage charges exceeding the value of the hired goods. 236 For present purposes, the Court of Appeal's non-recognition of a general concept of "good faith" "in matters of contract" is notable because of Moore-Bick L.J.'s expression of concern that this concept could subvert the process of contractual interpretation: "There is in my view a real danger that if a general principle of good faith were established it would be invoked as often to undermine as to support the terms in which the parties have reached agreement. The danger is not dissimilar to that posed by too liberal an approach to construction, against which the Supreme Court warned in Arnold 
VII. Concluding Remarks
The only interpretative endeavour (under English contract law) is objective ascertainment of the document's legal meaning. For this purpose, the reasonable reader (who must be commercially sensitive and astute) will consider everything which the law permits him to take into account, assessed at the time of formation. This objective search is illuminated by (a) the relevant background of the contract, to which both parties are deemed to be privy, including the commercial setting of the contract and (b) the parties' shared objective(s) under the transaction. But, necessarily, the objective construction cannot be contaminated by reference to the unilateral, particular, and subjective intentions of each party.
Commercial common sense is a versatile 238 element within the interpretative process: (1) it forms part of the overall framework within which the adjudicator construes the document; as such it is a member of an interpretative team of relevant factors which, sensitively applied, increase the chances of adjudication regularly yielding sound results; (2) CCS also operates as a "safety valve" criterion to guard against absurdity; (3) furthermore, whenever rival meanings genuinely emerge, even if absurdity is not in prospect, CCS comes into play as a potentially decisive factor.
The case law emphasises the need for a moderate and cautious use of commercial common sense, for the following reasons:
1. partisan arguments are often dressed up as issues of commercial common sense: judges should not be beguiled by forensic rhetoric which is a barely disguised plea for a favourable revision or gloss to suit one party but which is not truly supported by the document; 2. judges should not pretend to greater commercial or trade or "street" experience than they in fact possess;
